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THE ETHICS OF APOLOGY AND THE ROLE
OF AN OMBUDS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE
OFALAWYER1
Sharan Lee Levine and Paula A. Aylward2, 2003©
The topic of apology -basically saying, 'I'm sorry'~is one that
each of us as individuals is familiar with. Placing apology within the
context of the legal system -discussing if and how that simple phrase
'I'm sorry" can find a home within the law -is the focus of this pa-
per. Apology can serve many beneficial ends, and in many instances,
serves parties in the legal system.
As a starting point, we could probably all agree that it is the right
and the ethical thing to do to say, 'I'm sorry" for a wrong that you
have committed. Probably everyone remembers at least one instance
from childhood when this lesson hit home: you say you're sorry if
you hurt someone, or if you do something wrong. Better yet, you are
in fact sorry. Perhaps in the last few days, each of us has made an
apology -to a loved one, to a co-worker, to a stranger.
So normally, we are conscious of apologies, and we understand
apologies to be fundamental to our nature as fallible human beings.
After all, the Talmud teaches us: 'More beautiful is one hour of re-
pentance and good deeds in this world than all the life of the world to
come." Judeo-Christian ethics and other important spiritual and reli-
gious teachings contain similar messages of striving to do good deeds,
but being sure to make amends when they are less than good.
I This paper is the result of a presentation made at the invitation of the Michael K.
and Shirley Bach Endowment for the Ethics Center, Western Michigan University.
The authors are grateful to Dr. Shirley Bach for the invitation. Ms. Levine also
extends her thanks to her law partner, who is also her husband, Randall Levine, for
the unceasing support for Ms. Levine's interests, passions, and projects.
2 Ms. Levine is a shareholder in the Kalamazoo law firm, Levine & Levine, and Ms.
Aylward is an associate of the firm.
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the role of apology in the legal system, and the role of ombuds, the
main links being that both systems seek justice, restore confidence in
persons and entities, and bring a welcome reduction in litigation.
Before getting too far along, we want to acknowledge the valuable
sources which inform this discussion. First are several articles re-
garding apology in the law, by Assistant Professor Jonathon Cohen at
the University of Florida, and Professor Daniel Shuman, at Southern
Methodist University, among an abundance of writings on the sub-
ject.4 Also, the rich resources from within the Southwest Michigan
legal community have been invaluable: more than 20 years ago, Fed-
eral District Court Judge Richard Alan Enslen, in writing rules on
dispute resolution for the Western District of Michigan, suggested
apology as a means of resolving cases in the federal courts. For the
last several years, Kalamazoo County Circuit Court Judge William
Schma and lawyers in our community have been actively involved in
the theory and practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence. These re-
sources, together with our communications with Professor Cohen, Dr.
Shirley Bach, and our experience as an attorney representing ombuds
throughout this country, informed this paper.
'f\pology" is defined in many ways, but for our purposes, there
are three elements to an apology:
(I) admitting fault;
4 In particular, we found the following articles and the sources cited therein, to be of
particular help and interest: Jonathan R. Cohen, 'i\pology and Organizations: Ex-
ploring An Example From Medical Practice': Fordham Urban Law Journal, June
2000, Vol xxvn, No 5 (hereinafter cited as 'i\pology and Organizations'); Jona-
than R. Cohen, 'i\dvising Clients to Apologize': 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1004 (1999)
(hereinafter cited as 'i\dvising Clients'); Daniel W. Shuman, 'The Role of Apol-
ogy in Tort Law': Judicature Vol 83, Number 4 (2000) (hereinafter cited as 'The
Role of Apology'); Jonathan R. Cohen, Abstract of 'Legislating Apology: The Pros
and Cons': University of Cincinnati Law Review (Spring 2002); Elliot Klayman
and Seth Klayman, 'Punitive Damages: Toward Torah-Based Tort Reform': Car-
dozo Law Review, Vol 23: 1,200 I;and Marsha L. Wagner, 'i\pologies': California
Caucus of College and University Ombudsman, ucr Ombudsman: The Journal
1996. We are also grateful to Professor Jonathan Cohen and Dr. Shirley Bach for
their helpful insights offered during conversations.
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(2) expressing regret for the injurious action, and
(3) expressing sympathy for the other's injury. 5
The first element -admitting fault -relates to the issues of liabil-
ity or culpability. The latter two elements -expressing regret and/or
sympathy -relate to the offender's feelings. To demonstrate the dif-
ference among these elements, let's take a simple fact situation: a car
accident, in which one driver rear-ends another's vehicle. After the
accident, the offender might say, 'I am sorry about the accident':
This could mean several things, such as (1) 'it was my fault, I wasn't
paying attention': or (2) 'I regret that my car hit yours," or (3) 'I
hope you recover quickly.,,6
In the first scenario, the negligent driver has admitted liability -
he was negligent since he was not paying attention as he was driving.
In the second scenario, the driver is expressing regret that his day, and
the other driver's day, has been interrupted by this inconvenient acci-
dent. In the third scenario, the driver is expressing what might be
compassion, certainly unhappiness, that someone has been injured.7
The counterpart to apology is forgiveness, which can include ele-
ments of releasing the offender from liability, and/or ceasing resent-
ment against the offender.
So what are the positive effects of apology? There are many -
which inhere whether within the context of litigation or outside of it-
and they can include the following:8
5 See Cohen, 'I\dvising Clients': p 1014-1015.
8 See Cohen, 'I\dvising Clients': pp 1019-1023.
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1. The apology can remove the. insult from the injury -
not apologizing can be viewed as disrespectful and as
almost a second injury;
2. Apology can prevent future antagonIstIc behavior,
such as retaliation, or the filing of a lawsuit;
3. It can repair a relationship that may have been dam-
aged by the injury;
4. Apology can bring about quicker, and more satisfying,
settlement of the issues for all involved; and
5. It can help the offender's spiritual and psychological
growth, for, in Professor Cohen's words: 'tesponsibil-
ity and respect, rather than denial and avoidance, lie at
apology's core."g
The risks to the offender, or client, of making an apology can in-
clude psychological as well as financial risks.1o An example of the
former risk is that a person could view making an apology as showing
weakness, or humbling oneself. As to the latter, apart from the obvi-
ous liability concern, is that some insurance policies specifically pro-
hibit the insured from voluntarily assuming liability. Therefore, po-
tentially, under some insurance policies, a person who apologizes in
a way that admits liability may violate the terms of their insurance
contract, and potentially have no coverage for the accident.
In our car accident scenario referenced above, I have heard a story
in which the at-fault driver came over to the person whose car she had
hit, and apologized profusely. Upon talking with her lawyer/husband
a few minutes later, she was advised to retract her statements imme-
9 See Cohen, 'f\dvising Clients': p 1021.
10 See Cohen, 'f\dvising Clients': pp 1023-1030.
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diately -possibly because of genuine concern that the insurance pol-
icy might void coverage in the event she admitted fault for the acci-
dent.
In part because of these risks to making an apology, and in recog-
nition of the real benefits, growing numbers of legal scholars are call-
ing for a revision to our legal system to allow people to make 'safe"
apologies -that is, in a way that reduces the prospect of liability. 11
Professor Shuman, like Professor Cohen, believes there is a real
use for, and a need of, apology in the law. He cites the example of
the 1982 crash of a Japan Air Lines DC-8 in which 24 people died,
and 71 persons were injured. After that tragedy, the president of the
airlines personally apologized to each of the victims and their fami-
lies, and offered them compensation. 12
Not a single lawsuit was filed. Now, Professor Shuman makes
clear that cultural differences in Japan may, in part, account for the
absence of lawsuits in that situation,13 however, the power of apology
cannot be disregarded.
Nonetheless, apology can never be a complete panacea; it will not
make every wrong right. Professor Shuman points out that for some
survivors of the holocaust, for example, an apology is without mean-
ing; for the Pearl Harbor Survivors' Association, a public apology by
Japanese veterans was rejected.14 For these wrongs and others of
similar magnitude, it is likely that there are no words that could ever
adequately respond to -certainly never repair -the harm done.
II Professor Cohen uses the term '~afe"apology, in the context of his discussion of
protecting a client from adverse consequences when the apology is, or is perceived
to be, an admission of liability. See Cohen, 'I\dvising Clients': pp 1031-1041.
12 See Shuman, 'The Role of Apology'; p 184.
13 Yd.
14 Yd.
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In other situations, though, it may be that the person making the
apology is -or appears to be -insincere. That may well have been
the trouble with President Nixon's resignation speech, or with Senator
Trent Lott's apology for his comments about his praise of Strom
Thurmond's segregation policies. No doubt all of us could cite sev-
eral examples of an apology that just did not work, that fell short or
even exacerbated the insult. The problem with public persons and
public apologies is the perception that the apology is a mere formula
response: 'I'm sorry it I offended anyone;" 'I'm sorry iL my remarks
were perceived to be disrespectful': These approaches are awkward,
as they seem to be driven by political strategy.
7
Ultimately, the problem can be that, as Professor Shuman notes:
'For some victims, apologies are only a vehicle for wrongdoers to
save face or avoid liability.,,15
But even though an apology does not address all wrongs nor heal
all wounds, apology should be encouraged.
There is an increasing appreciation of the positive potential affect
of apology within the law, just as there has been a trend in the estab-
lishment of programs -like ombuds' offices -and other systems to
help redress wrongs, correct mistakes, reduce litigation, and to foster
settlement.
For example, Professor Cohen details the success of a program
begun by the Lexington Kentucky Veterans Affairs Medical Center in
1987.16 This program was geared to surface, address, and respond to,
instances of medical error. Though many voiced concerns that the
hospital was opening itself up to ruinous liability, the hospital's posi-
tion was that it was simply accepting responsibility when at fault. It
15 Id.
16 See Cohen, ':A.pology and Organizations': pp 1448-1454.
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formed a committee to review errors reported from its staff, and the
affected patient and their family were immediately informed, received
an apology from the person responsible, and were offered appropriate
medical care, and ajust amount of compensation. 17
The hospital's policy made clear that it wished to create a culture
in which mistakes could be acknowledged and hopefully avoided in
the future. In some instances, if the error was found to be systemic,
the hospital was able to implement a better system, which eliminated
the problem entirely. 18
A newspaper article detailing the hospital's policy noted an addi-
tional benefit to the hospital's forthright approach: patients' trust in
the hospital was reinforced rather than undermined -and this even
though the patient had just learned of the hospital's or treating physi-
cian's mistake. 19 Patients reported feeling increased trust in the facil-
ity since they had been dealt with honestly. Another benefit as re-
ported, was that the hospital soon found that 'tloing the right thing"
could also mean saving money.20
To illustrate this point, the article reported that just before institut-
ing the new policy, the hospital had defended two mal~ractice claims
which resulted in verdicts of $1.5 million in one year. I Those sums
do not include the costs of the hospital or of the litigation process. By
contrast, between 1990-1996, the hospital paid an average of about
$190,000 per year in malpractice claims, with no litigation costs22.
17 Id.
18 Td.This point is also made in Cohen, ')\dvising Clients'; pp 1468; 1473-1476.
19 See, Cohen, ')\pology and Organizations'; pp 1449-1451.
20 Td.
21 See Cohen, ')\pology and Organizations': p 1451.
22 See Cohen, ')\pology and Organizations': p 1453-1454.
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This excellent track record caught the attention of other areas of
the veterans system: in 1995, the Department of Veterans Affairs
adopted a risk management policy that requires that the patient be in-
formed of the error, be offered appropriate medical treatment, and be
informed of the right to apply for compensation. Recently, several
other VA hospitals adopted the Lexington model.23
This trend reveals what is truly a win-win situation, rather than
the one that normally prevails in which a doctor, or other person,
wants to apologize for having caused an injury, but does not do so out
of a fear of being sued. It is often the absence of an apology that be-
comes the added insult to injury - and causes the victim to file the
lawsuit. This was what occurred in the highly publicized and well-
known case in which a woman was severely burned spilling McDon-
ald's coffee in her lap. It was reported that all the injured woman
wanted was an apology and an acknowledgment that a systemic prob-
lem existed concerning hot coffee purchased at the drive-thru win-
dow.
And if we think about that for a minute, it makes sense: don't we
all know of situations in which all we wanted to hear was a sincere
'I'm sorry': and when we did not hear those words, the seeds of an-
ger or resentment or distrust took root. Professor Cohen writes of
various studies that document this "vicious cycle': and reveal that
many people only wanted someone to be honest with them, to ac-
knowledge what had happened, to say they were sorry.24
Professor Cohen provides an example of how in the non-medical
field as well, the use of apology has yielded benefits.25 The Toro
23 See Cohen, 'f\pology and Organizations': p 1454.
24 See Cohen, 'f\pology and Organizations': p 1458, fn I.
25 See Cohen, 'f\pology and Organizations': p 1460-1463, citing the experience of
The Toro Company.
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Company, a manufacturer of lawn equipment, was experiencing about
125 personal injury lawsuits each year. Up until 1991, Toro's policy
was to aggressively defend, and to litigate every single case. At that
point, however, Toro decided to offer to mediate, rather than litigate,
every claim,z6
Mediation is a less formal process than litigation, in which a neu-
tral evaluator listens to both parties and tries to recommend a resolu-
tion of the dispute which satisfies both of them.
During the mediation process, Toro's attorney, Miguel Olivella,
would express sympathy for the claimant's injury, and make a fair
offer of settlement. The attorney would not typically admit Toro's
fault for the injury or accident, but expressed sympathy only.27 As
Mr. Olivella noted:
'~pology to an injured claimant has been something I
do from the beginning of the mediation. It lets the
claimant know that despite the accident's fault, no one
takes any pleasure in knowing that a human being has
been injured, seemingly putting the claimant more at
ease when he discovers that the company is not the
cold, cruel, evil empire he may have thought we were.
In the context of a mediation, it is possible to act in
such a fashion without it being a sign of weakness. ,,28
The interesting difference between Toro's policy and the Lexing-
ton VA's program is worth noting. At the VA, the source of the in-
jury was known to staff at the hospital since they have the records.
But, in the Toro cases, initially, the company has little information
about the injury, which could only be learned as the matter pro-
gressed.
26 Td.
27 See Cohen, ')\pology and Organizations': p 1461-1462.
28 Td.
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Using this approach, Toro settled claims much more quickly and
at lower cost to the company than it had done using its 'tlam the tor-
pedoes" litigation strategy. The average payout per claim before
1991 was over $68,000; after the program began the average compen-
sation was reduced to about $18,000. In addition, claims were re-
solved much more quickly with the mediation process which aver-
aged 4 months, as opposed to an average of 2 years for litigation.29
Why, in the face of such success stories as these and others, is
apology not used more frequently to help resolve disputes?
Professor Cohen posits that it is due to the tension inherent in the
laws of evidence that govern trials. Trials are designed, on the one
hand to seek the truth, but on the other hand, to settle disputes and
compromise claims. The rules of evidence - which govern what is
permitted in as testimony or evidence in a trial -support the basic no-
tion of a party's admissions as the 'queen of proof' to prove a
claim.3D What better evidence to establish liability than the offender's
own statements admitting the conduct? But, what greater disincentive
to say you are sorry, and to admit you are wrong, than that your own
words will be used to establish guilt or liability for damages? This
conflict is manifested in the rules of evidence.
The most basic rule states in part, 'hll relevant evidence is admis-
sible." This rule embodies the general notion that the rules of evi-
dence, and in the civil context, the rules of discovery, are meant to
assist in seeking the truth of a matter.
We would probably all agree that a statement acknowledging
blame or fault for an accident or injury is relevant on the issue of
what or who caused the injury. It may also help to establish how the
29 rd.
30 See Cohen, '~dvising Clients': p \031.
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injury or accident was caused, and by extension, who should be pun-
ished for it, or who should pay damages.
But another rule excludes evidence or statements made during the
course of compromise negotiations. In other words, after a lawsuit
has begun, statements made in an effort to resolve the dispute cannot
later be used as evidence against the party making them. However,
such evidence could be used later on to prove bias or prejudice of a
witness, and for certain other purposes.31
Another rule excluding statements or actions from evidence in a
trial concerns subsequent remedial measures; take for example a
situation in which someone is injured when he falls through a step
leading up to your house; if, after the injury, and to prevent anyone
else being injured, you fix the step, the injured party cannot offer evi-
dence of these subsequent remedial measures to prove your negli-
gence or culpability, with some exceptions.32
A third rule keeps out of evidence an offer you might make to pay
someone's hospital or medical bills, and the fact that you pay those
bills.33
Other evidentiary concepts are contained in the exceptions to the
hearsay rule. We are a society consumed with court cases, and televi-
sion programs about the law and legal process. Everyone thinks they
know what hearsay is, but here is a refresher: the hearsay rule says
that a witness may not offer an out of court statement when the state-
ment is being used to prove the truth of a matter asserted. In the car
crash example: the victim can not get on the witness stand at trial and
31 See Cohen, ')\dvising Clients"pp 1032-1036 for a discussion about Federal Rule
of Evidence ('FRE') 408, 407 and 409. See also, Michigan Rules of Evidence
('MRE') 407, 408, 409, which are identical to FRE 407, 408, 409.
32 rd.
33 rd.
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state that he/she heard the passenger in the other driver's car say 'the
driver did not see the red light and ran into the back end of your car."
But some exceptions to the hearsay rule might permit statements to be
repeated in court - for example the exception which permits state-
ments made in the excitement of the moment.34
Some of these evidentiary rules, then, though the result of efforts
to craft a balance between admitting relevant evidence but not dis-
couraging honest statements, or honest efforts to correct problems,
can effectively discourage a person from apologizing.
There are certain 'safe harbors" in which a person could make an
apology safely, however. One such safety net mentioned before pro-
tects an apology made during the course of compromise negotiations;
the biggest drawback to this rule is that it only applies when litigation
has already begun.
Other 'safe harbors" within which to make an apology are in the
context of mediation, or pursuant to a contract such as a confidential-
ity agreement, or pursuant to a court's order. 35
In light of this, should attorneys advise their clients to apologize?
In appropriate circumstances, yes.
There are probably many reasons attorneys do not advise clients
to apologize, but several innocent explanations are that for one, the
idea simply does not occur to the attorney, since until the last several
years, law students were not introduced to the subject of alternate dis-
pute resolution or apology in law school. It could be that the attorney
is not aware that making a 'safe"apology is possible. It might be the
attorney does not want to appear disloyal to the client; or that the par-
34 See, generally, MRE 804.
35 See Cohen, ':A.dvising Clients': pp 1031-1041.
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ties themselves are too intractable to al10w an apology or to pennit
meaningful resolution of the dispute.
Some of the less savory reasons why attorneys do not raise the
issue of apology with their clients are that the attorney wants to ap-
pear tough, and an apology could appear to be soft; or that the attor-
neys' fees will be far less if the matter is resolved sooner rather than
Iater.36
As we have noted, not all incidents, or injuries, can be addressed,
healed or rectified through the use of apology. However, in many
legal situations, apology can be an effective mechanism - together
with an appropriate offer of compensation -to help resolve disputes.
Especially now in this climate of distrust of corporate governance,
the model of an entity dealing openly, honestly and fairly, with its
mistakes or errors, is a refreshing change. With the recent passage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200237 regarding corporate responsibility
and corporate governance, establishment of systems such as that at
the Lexington VA Hospital, and the Toro Company, and at other in-
stitutions in which ombuds offices have been established, should in-
crease.
The adoption of legislation excluding apologies from being of-
fered to prove liability could go a long way to increasing the benefits
this policy can bring. A number of states have enacted or are consid-
ering legislation which excludes an apology made at the time of the
incident from being offered to establish liability.38 On the other hand,
36 See Cohen, ')\dvising Clients': pp 1042-1047.
37 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was the legislative response to the disclosures of corpo-
rate corruption and malfeasance at Enron, Arthur Anderson, among others.
38 See Cohen, ')\dvising Clients': p 1030. Massachusetts was the first state to
adopt such legislation, proposed by a legislator whose young daughter was killed
when she was struck, while riding her bicycle, by an automobile. The legislator
learned that the reason the motorist did not apologize for having killed the little girl
14
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congress is currently debating tort reform, and nowhere in the discus-
sion could we find mention of apology or meaningful methods of re-
solving disputes in this proposed effort. Perhaps the primary problem
with legislating apology however, is the distinction between making
the apology and admitting liability. With regard to ombuds' functions,
similarities between the role of apology in the law and the role of the
ombuds are striking.
The American Bar Association recently adopted standards for en-
couraging the use and the establishment and operation of ombuds of-
fices.39 Ombuds are complaint handlers - they receive complaints
and questions from individuals concerning persons and problems
within an entity, whether a branch of government, a company, an
academic institution, or nursing homes, just as examples. Ombuds
work to resolve particular issues, and when appropriate, make rec-
ommendations for the improvement of the general administration of
the entities they serve. Ombuds protect the legitimate interests and
rights of individuals with respect to each other, and protect individual
rights against the excesses of public and private bureaucracies. Om-
buds protect those who work within an entity, and those who are af-
fected by an entity's actions.
The essential characteristics of an ombuds are independence, con-
fidentiality, and impartiality. An ombuds must be able to operate in-
dependently from the entity in which it serves. Without independ-
ence, an ombuds' efforts could be undermined, by, for example, hav-
ing its budget cut as retaliation for the ombuds' findings which might
be critical of the entity.
was from a real fear of liability. The Massachusetts legislation provides that:
'Statements, writings or benevolent gestures expressing sympathy or a general
sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering or death of a person involved in
an accident and made to such person or to the family of such person shall be inad-
missible as evidence of an admission of liability in a civil action." Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 233, ~3D (1992).
39 See American Bar Association Standards for the Establishment and Operation of
Ombuds Offices, August 200 I.
15
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Ombuds operate with confidentiality, which means that all callers
or visitors to the ombuds' office can report any concern or complaint
without fear of being targeted as a whistle-blower.
Ombuds must be impartial -they are not an advocate for the visi-
tor to their office, nor are they an advocate for the entity in which
they work. Ombuds are advocates for fairness and justice.
Today, ombuds are found in nearly every part of the world, and in
a wide variety of entities. Here in the United States, the establish-
ment of ombuds' offices grew as a result of the civil unrest of the late
1960's. The first university ombuds was established at Michigan
State University. Ombuds serve in other Michigan universities -such
as Western Michigan University, University of Michigan, as well as
in colleges and universities throughout this country. More than 200
ombuds serve in corporations such as Eastman Kodak, Coors Brew-
ing Company, and Coca Cola. In March, 2003, the Tyco Company
named an ombuds. In government, for more than 25 years, the City
of Detroit has had an ombudsman, voted on by the citizens of that
city. A number of other cities, as well as county, state, and the fed-
eral governments, established ombuds offices serving the citizens of
those communities.
As we discussed earlier, in the veterans hospital example, the re-
ports of errors came from within the entity; in the Toro example, the
reports generally came from outside of the entity. In both instances,
the reports were given prompt attention, due consideration, investiga-
tion, and a reasonable and fair response was formulated. All of these
efforts can be undertaken by ombuds as well, based upon reports from
inside or outside the entity, or upon the ombuds' own initiative and
observations.
As with the Lexington VA and the Toro policies, the ombuds'
system is less formal -and certainly less adversarial -than litigation,
and can often help the parties to avoid litigation entirely. Like those
other approaches, the ombuds' system has resulted in financial sav-
16
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ings to organizations in which ombuds serve. Often an employee
grievance, or a citizen complaint, if aired to an impartial and objective
person, can lead to a resolution which satisfies the complainant, and
which may help the entity, by ensuring reform of a needed systemic
Issue.
The bottom line is that a policy of apology -like the ombuds'
process -can remove much of the sting out of the injury. Both proc-
esses can be cathartic and therapeutic, and are certainly more humane
than the adversarial posturing which seem inherent in, and insepara-
ble from, the litigation process.
In addition to the benefits which accrue to the complainant, and
the economic benefits to the entity, the apology and ombuds proc-
esses also bring about other and non-economic benefits -such as al-
leviating guilt of an offender, repairing a damaged relationship, re-
storing trust, among others.
17
To be effective, apologies must be sincere, and, as Professor
Cohen notes, they '~hould be rooted in responsibility and remorse
rather than in economics and strategy. It is the ethical response to
injuring another, irrespective of the economic consequences.,,40 That
point resonates as being another parallel between a policy of apology
and the establishment of an ombuds' office: that it is the right thing to
do, that it creates a supportive and caring atmosphere in which griev-
ances can be aired confidentially, investigated impartially, addressed
ethically and fairly, and resolved promptly.
Another similarity between apology and ombuds is the concern
that establishing an ombuds' office will open the organization up to
liability. This concern stems from the fact that ombuds may be field-
ing complaints of matters that may be illegal, such as work place dis-
crimination, sexual harassment, and the like.
40 See Cohen, '~pology and Organizations': p 1459.
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However, you will recall that the Lexington VA Hospital adminis-
trators were also confronted with those concerns, but they instituted
their policy of review and apology anyway. And what they found
was that they had not opened the floodgates to litigation and ruinous
liability but instead, to financial savings, since fewer lawsuits were
filed. In my years as counsel to ombuds, I have seen a similar realiza-
tion dawn among the entities which established ombuds' offices.
Ombuds use apology as one of the tools in their toolbox in work-
ing toward effective resolution of an issue. Ombuds Marsha Wagner
of Columbia University developed materials for teaching effective
apology to ombuds.41 Dr. Wagner summarizes some of the elements
of an effective apology and includes the following six considerations.
1. An apology might contain a statement that sets forth a
common understanding of the substance and nature of the of-
fense or perceived offense. Such as - 'yesterday, on the phone
I said ..."
2. Another consideration might include recognizing respon-
sibility or accountability on the part of the one who offended -
for example, 'I could have chosen other words ..."
3. Third, acknowledging the pain or embarrassment that the
offended party experienced. Such as 'it's understandable that
was upsetting to you."
4. The apology might contain a judgment about the offense,
for example: 'I was insensitive."
5. Generally, we expect an apology to contain a statement of
regret: '1am sorry I used those words."
4\ Marsha L. Wagner, 'I\pologies'; California Caucus of College and University
Ombudsman, UCI Ombudsman: The Journal 1996.
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6. And, finally, the apology might include a statement about
future intentions: '1n the future, I will try to think about what I
say before I say it..."
Every year, ombuds help resolve massive numbers of complaints
on issues ranging from procedure and process for employment op-
tions, to illegal activity; from workplace violence and deep-seeded
resentment and hurt associated with allegations of race discrimina-
tion, to matters relating to ethical and fair treatment. Each of the gov-
ernmental units, corporations and academic institutions with estab-
lished ombuds offices have reduced litigation, improved morale and
productivity and satisfactorily resolved many issues.When an organi-
zation is willing to accept responsibility for errors, employees become
more willing to report their own errors, which, in turn, makes it easier
for the organization to then correct the system. Apology can help all
persons involved make appropriate corrections.
To sum up, we can look to the words of Abraham Lincoln who
said more than 150 years ago:
'Discourage litigation. Pe rsuade your neighbors to
compromise whenever you can. Point out to them how
the nominal winner is often a real loser - in fees, ex-
penses, and waste of time. As a peacemaker the lawyer
has a superior opportunity of being a good man (and I
think if he were alive today, woman). There will still
be business enough.,,42
42 See Cohen, 'i\pology and Organizalions': fn 98, p 1472.
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